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Abstract
Quantum pseudo-telepathy games are good examples of explaining the strangeness of quantum mechanics
and demonstrating the advantage of quantum resources over classical resources. Most of the quantum pseudo-
telepathy games are common interest games, nevertheless conflicting interest games are more widely used to
model real world situations. Recently Pappa et al. (Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401, 2015) proposed the first
two-party conflicting interest game where quantum advice enhances social optimality. In the present paper we
give two new three-party conflicting interest games and show that quantum advice can enhance social optimality
in a three-party setting. The first game we propose is based on the famous GHZ game which is a common
interest game. The second game we propose is related to the Svetlichny inequality which demonstrates quantum
mechanics cannot be explained by the local hidden variable model in a three-party setting.
Keywords: Quantum pseudo-telepathy game, nonlocal quantum game, multiparty game
1 Introduction
Game theory is a useful analysis tool in many realms of scientific researches. In the realm of quantum mechanics, a
lot of games (called quantum pseudo-telepathy games or nonlocal quantum games in the literatures, called quantum
games for short in the present paper) have been proposed in order to illustrate the strangeness of quantum mechanics
to non-physicists. For example, Bell inequalities [1] can be rephrased as games with incomplete information (also
called Bayesian games) [2]. Usage of game theory terms like “input, output, payoff, advice” instead of physics
terms like “observable, measurement, eigenvalue, hidden variable, entanglement” makes it easier for non-physicists
to understand “nonlocality” [3], one of the strangest properties of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, quantum
games are good examples of demonstrating the advantage of quantum resources over classical resources because
quantum advice can enhance the players’ payoffs in these games. We remark that without more restrictions,
quantum mechanics only offers advantages for Bayesian games, i.e., when the parties receive inputs or, in other
words, when there are more than a single measurement setting for each party [4].
Most of the quantum games are common interest games [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Common interest means that
even though each player’s goal is to maximize his/her own payoff regardless of the other players’, their interests have
no conflict. Thus they tend to cooperate as a team when playing common interest games. A team with quantum
resources can outperform a team with only classical resources in quantum games. But more often in the real
world players have conflicting interests and they tend to compete rather than cooperate. Can quantum resources
offer an advantage to conflicting interest games? Recently, Pappa et al. [13] proposed the first conflicting interest
game where quantum advice and quantum strategy can enhance social optimality. They suggest that it would be
interesting to find more conflicting interest games where quantum mechanics offers an advantage, for example when
larger dimensions are used or in a multiparty setting. Later, Situ [14] proposed a conflicting interest game with
ternary outputs where 3−dimensional quantum systems are used to enhance social optimality. A conflicting interest
quantum game with ternary inputs is also given [14].
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In the present paper, we try to find conflicting interest games where quantum mechanics can enhance social
optimality in a three-party setting. Specifically, we construct a new three-party conflicting interest game on the
basis of the common interest GHZ game [5], and show that quantum advice can enhance social optimality in this
new game. In the GHZ game, the combination of the three players’ inputs are promised to belong to a subset of the
product of the individuals’ input sets. It would be interesting to ask whether a similar game without this restriction
still benefits from quantum advice. The answer is affirmative. We construct another three-party conflicting interest
game without the input restriction and show that quantum advice can also enhance the social optimality in this
game.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the concepts of Bayesian game,
advice and equilibirum. Section 3 reviews the original common interest GHZ game. Section 4 gives our first game
which is constructed on the basis of the GHZ game. Section 5 gives our second game which is free from input
restriction. Section 6 is a brief conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
Bayesian game is used to model situations in which some of the players are not certain of the characteristics of some
of the other players. Here we define a Bayesian game in the three-party framework (for a more general definition
refer to Ref. [15]). A three-party Bayesian game consists of:
- three players, here we call them Alice(A), Bob(B) and Charlie(C),
and for each player i ∈ {A,B,C}
- a set Xi of inputs xi,
- a set Yi of outputs yi,
- a payoff function $i : X × Y → R, where X = XA × XB × XC ,Y = YA × YB × YC , R denotes the set of real
numbers
and
- a probability distribution P : X → [0, 1].
The games studied in the present paper all involve binary inputs and binary outputs, i.e., Xi = Yi = {0, 1}. We
introduce the notation x = (xA, xB, xC) and y = (yA, yB, yC) for convenience. The game is played as follows. Each
player i ∈ {A,B,C} receives an input xi, and must produce an output yi, respectively. Each player only knows
his/her own input but not the other players’, and they are not allowed to communicate with each other. Each
player’s goal is to maximize his/her average payoff
Fi =
∑
x∈X
P (x)
∑
y∈Y
Pr(y|x)$i(x, y), (1)
where Pr(y|x) is the probability of the players outputting y given inputs x.
To play the game, each player should decide on a particular strategy. A pure strategy for player i consists in
associating an output yi for every possible input xi, i.e., a mapping Xi → Yi. More generally, each player i may
use a mixed strategy, defined by Pr(yi|xi), which is the probability of outputting yi given the input xi. A pure
strategy is also a mixed strategy satisfying that for any xi ∈ Xi, there exists only one yi ∈ Yi such that Pr(yi|xi)
is nonzero. If all players adopt mixed strategies the probability Pr(y|x) is factorizable:
Pr(y|x) = Pr(yA|xA)Pr(yB |xB)Pr(yC |xC). (2)
A triple of strategies (Pr(yA|xA), P r(yB |xB), P r(yC |xC)) is an equilibrium [15] if each player cannot obtain a higher
average payoff by deviating from his/her strategy, as long as the other players keep their strategies unchanged.
We also consider the case where the players receive advice from a source that is independent of the inputs x, and
that can be classical or quantum. This opens the possibility for the players to adopt correlated strategies, which
can outperform independent strategies.
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In the case of classical advice, we define a correlated strategy si : Xi ×Ωi → Yi, where Ωi is the space of advice
given to player i by the source and the source chooses the advice r = (rA, rB , rC) from the space Ω = ΩA×ΩB×ΩC
following a probability distribution Q. Given an input xi and advice ri, player i chooses the output yi = si(xi, ri).
If all players follow a correlated strategy s = (sA, sB, sC), then
Pr(y|x) =
∑
r∈Ω
Q(r)Pr(yA|xA, rA)Pr(yB |xB , rB)Pr(yC |xC , rC)
=
∑
r∈Ω
Q(r)Pr
(
yA equals sA(xA, rA)
)
Pr
(
yB equals sB(xB , rB)
)
Pr
(
yC equals sC(xC , rC)
)
, (3)
which is generally not factorizable. A correlated strategy s is a correlated equilibrium [16] if player i cannot gain a
higher average payoff by changing his/her strategy unilaterally for any i ∈ {A,B,C}.
In the case of quantum advice, we define a quantum strategy M = (A,B, C, |Ψ〉), with A = (A0,A1), B =
(B0,B1) and C = (C0, C1). The players apply, respectively, the observables AxA = {A
0
xA
, A1xA}, BxB = {B
0
xB
, B1xB}
and CxC = {C
0
xC
, C1xC} on the shared quantum state or advice |Ψ〉. The probability of the players outputting y
given x is
Pr(y|x) = 〈Ψ|AyAxA ⊗B
yB
xB
⊗ CyCxC |Ψ〉, (4)
which can in general not be reproduced by any classical local model. A quantum strategy M is a quantum
equilibrium [13] if no player can gain a higher average payoff by choosing a different strategy unilaterally.
3 The GHZ game
The famous GHZ game [5] is widely used to illustrate the strangeness of quantum mechanics in many literatures.
It involves three players, Alice, Bob and Charlie. Each player i ∈ {A,B,C} has the input set Xi = {0, 1}, and
X = XA × XB × XC follows the probability distribution P (0, 0, 0) = P (0, 1, 1) = P (1, 0, 1) = P (1, 1, 0) = 1/4. We
can see that the inputs satisfy condition xA ⊕ xB ⊕ xC = 0. The output set for each player i is Yi = {0, 1}. The
payoff function $i for player i is defined as follows:
$i(0, 0, 0, yA, yB, yC) =
{
1, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
, (5)
$i(x, yA, yB, yC) =
{
1, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
, (6)
for every x ∈ {011, 101, 110}, where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2. Because the payoff functions for all players are
the same, they have common interest.
It’s well known that there’s no way for the three players to obtain a payoff of 1 for sure by classical advice.
However, if they are able to share a GHZ state, they can choose suitable measurement settings according to the
inputs and then output their measurement outcomes of their particles, which always result in a payoff of 1. Having
access to quantum advice, the team can obtain a payoff of 1 with certainty. Therefore the GHZ game demonstrates
that shared entanglement can generate some correlations that cannot be explained by the local hidden variable
model in a three-party setting.
4 Three-party conflicting interest quantum game with promised in-
puts
This section presents our first three-party conflicting interest quantum game where the inputs satisfy xA⊕xB⊕xC =
0, like the GHZ game. Our game has the same structure as the GHZ game, except for different payoff functions
3
$A, $B, $C for Alice, Bob and Charlie. We define the three payoff functions as follows:
$A,B,C(0, 0, 0, yA, yB, yC) =
{
(4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
), yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
, (7)
$A,B,C(x, yA, yB, yC) =


(2, 1, 1), (yA, yB, yC) = (1, 0, 0)
(1, 2, 1), (yA, yB, yC) = (0, 1, 0)
(1, 1, 2), (yA, yB, yC) = (0, 0, 1)
(4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
), (yA, yB, yC) = (1, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0), yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
, (8)
for every x ∈ {011, 101, 110}. The values in the triples refer to Alice, Bob and Charlie’s payoffs respectively.
In the absence of advice, equilibria with average payoffs (13
12
, 5
6
, 13
12
) and (13
12
, 13
12
, 5
6
) fulfil Alice’s preference, equi-
libria with average payoffs (5
6
, 13
12
, 13
12
) and (13
12
, 13
12
, 5
6
) fulfil Bob’s preference, equilibria with average payoffs (5
6
, 13
12
, 13
12
)
and (13
12
, 5
6
, 13
12
) fulfil Charlie’s preference. However, no one equilibrium can fulfil all three players’ preferences, so
conflicting interests rise. In the case of classical advice, the set of all possible triples of average payoffs (FA, FB, FC)
forms a convex polytope in R3. We can therefore examine all possible strategies and see that FA + FB + FC ≤ 3,
which is of course satisfied by all possible correlated equilibria. The social optimal outcome is at most 3.
Now we add up all the three players’ payoffs to get the total payoff
$total(0, 0, 0, yA, yB, yC) =
{
4, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
, (9)
$total(x, yA, yB, yC) =
{
4, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
, (10)
for every x ∈ {011, 101, 110}. This total payoff function is the same as the common payoff function of the original
GHZ game except for a factor of 4. If the players are able to share a GHZ state |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), they can
measure their particles in a suitable measurement setting according to the inputs, and then output the measurement
outcomes. Because the measurement outcomes always result in a payoff of 4 no matter what the inputs are, using
quantum advice enhances the total average payoff from 3 to 4, a better social optimal outcome is achieved.
For completeness we include the measurement settings [5] used in this game. If a player receives an input
0, he/she will measure his/her particle in the |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) basis (the eigenstates
of the Pauli σX operator) and if he/she gets outcome |+〉, then he/she outputs 0 and if he/she gets outcome
|−〉, then he/she outputs 1. Similarly if a player receives an input 1, he/she measures his/her particle in the
| + i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉), | − i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉) basis (the eigenstates of the Pauli σY operator) and if he/she gets
outcome |+ i〉, then he/she outputs 0 and if he/she gets outcome | − i〉, then he/she outputs 1. By straightforward
calculation we have Pr(1, 0, 0|x) = Pr(0, 1, 0|x) = Pr(0, 0, 1|x) = Pr(1, 1, 1|x) = 1/4 for every x ∈ {011, 101, 110},
thus the average payoffs for each player is 1
4
(2 + 1 + 1 + 4
3
) = 4
3
. The solution is fair.
A further question is whether the above quantum fair strategies constitute an equilibrium? The answer is
affirmative. We first prove that Alice cannot obtain an average payoff higher than 4
3
by unilaterally deviating from
her strategy as long as Bob and Charlie keep their strategies unchanged. We distinguish four cases according to the
inputs x. In the case x = (0, 0, 0), Alice’s maximal payoff defined in Eq. (7) is 4
3
. No matter what measurements
the three players perform, Alice cannot obtain an average payoff higher than 4
3
. In the case x = (0, 1, 1), Bob and
Charlie will both measure observable σY . By straightforward calculation we can see that Bob and Charlie will get
measurement outcomes (0, 0),(1, 0),(0, 1),(1, 1) with equal probability. By referring to Eq. (8), we can see that the
upper bound of Alice’s average payoff is 1
4
(2 + 1+ 1+ 4
3
) = 4
3
. The distribution of Bob and Charlie’s measurement
outcomes are independent of Alice’s choice of measurement because of the no-signalling condition, so Alice cannot
obtain an average payoff higher than 4
3
by unilateral deviation. In the other two cases x = (1, 0, 1) and x = (1, 1, 0),
same conclusions can be made. So we complete the proof that Alice cannot obtain an average payoff higher than 4
3
by unilateral deviation. In the same way we can prove that neither Bob nor Charlie can obtain an average payoff
higher than 4
3
by unilateral deviation. So we complete the proof that the above quantum fair strategies constitute
an equilibrium.
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5 Three-party conflicting interest quantum game with all inputs
In the previous section we construct a conflicting interest quantum game on the basis of the common interest GHZ
game where the inputs are promised to belong to a subset {000, 011, 101, 110} of X = {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}.
Now we come to the question whether quantum advice can also enhance social optimality in a similar three-party
conflicting interest game where all inputs x ∈ X are allowable. The answer is affirmative and we give an example
in this section. Let P (xA, xB, xC) = 1/8 for every (xA, xB , xC) ∈ XA × XB × XC , and define the payoff functions
as follows:
$A,B,C(0, 0, 0, yA, yB, yC) =
{
(4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
), yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
, (11)
$A,B,C(1, 1, 1, yA, yB, yC) =
{
(4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
), yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
, (12)
$A,B,C(x, yA, yB, yC) =


(2, 1, 1), (yA, yB, yC) = (1, 0, 0)
(1, 2, 1), (yA, yB, yC) = (0, 1, 0)
(1, 1, 2), (yA, yB, yC) = (0, 0, 1)
(4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
), (yA, yB, yC) = (1, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0), yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
, (13)
$A,B,C(x
′, yA, yB, yC) =


(2, 1, 1), (yA, yB, yC) = (0, 1, 1)
(1, 2, 1), (yA, yB, yC) = (1, 0, 1)
(1, 1, 2), (yA, yB, yC) = (1, 1, 0)
(4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
), (yA, yB, yC) = (0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0), yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
, (14)
for every x ∈ {011, 101, 110} and x′ ∈ {100, 010, 001}.
In the absence of advice, equilibria with average payoffs (7
6
, 11
12
, 11
12
) fulfil Alice’s preference, equilibria with
average payoffs (11
12
, 7
6
, 11
12
) fulfil Bob’s preference, equilibria with average payoffs (11
12
, 11
12
, 7
6
) fulfil Charlie’s preference.
However, no one equilibrium can fulfil all the three players’ preferences, so they have conflicting interests. In the
case of classical advice, we have FA +FB +FC ≤ 3, which is of course satisfied by all possible correlated equilibria.
The social optimal outcome is at most 3.
We add up all the three players’ payoffs to get the total payoff
$total(x, yA, yB, yC) =
{
4, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
, (15)
$total(x
′, yA, yB, yC) =
{
4, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 0
0, yA ⊕ yB ⊕ yC = 1
, (16)
for every x ∈ K1 = {111, 011, 101, 110} and x
′ ∈ K0 = {000, 100, 010, 001}. The total average payoff function can
be written as
Ftotal =
∑
x∈K0∪K1
P (x)
∑
y∈Y
Pr(y|x)$total(x, y)
=
1
8
∑
x∈K0
∑
yA⊕yB⊕yC=0
Pr(y|x) · 4 +
1
8
∑
x∈K1
∑
yA⊕yB⊕yC=1
Pr(y|x) · 4
=
1
2
∑
x∈K0
1 + E(x)
2
+
1
2
∑
x∈K1
1− E(x)
2
=2 +
1
4
( ∑
x∈K0
E(x) −
∑
x∈K1
E(x)
)
=2 +
1
4
(
E(000) + E(100) + E(010) + E(001)− E(111)− E(011)− E(101)− E(110)
)
, (17)
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where we have defined
E(x) =
∑
yA⊕yB⊕yC=0
Pr(y|x)−
∑
yA⊕yB⊕yC=1
Pr(y|x)
=2
∑
yA⊕yB⊕yC=0
Pr(y|x) − 1
=1− 2
∑
yA⊕yB⊕yC=1
Pr(y|x). (18)
E(000) + E(100) + E(010) + E(001)− E(111)− E(011)− E(101) − E(110) is actually the Bell expression of the
Svetlichny inequality [17]. The classical bound for the Svetlichny inequality is 4 and the quantum violation is
approximately 5.656. If the players have access to quantum advice, the total average payoff can be enhanced from
3 to approximately 2 + 1
4
· 5.656 ≈ 3.414, a better social optimal outcome is achieved. We have checked that the
quantum state and the measurement settings [17] for the quantum violation result in a fair allocation of payoff.
The average payoffs for the three players are approximately (1.138, 1.138, 1.138).
Moreover, the above quantum fair strategies constitute an equilibrium. This can be proved via semidefinite
programming (SDP). We first show that Alice cannot obtain a higher average payoff by unilaterally deviating from
her strategy as long as Bob and Charlie keep their strategies unchanged. In order to apply the technique in Ref.
[18], which employs SDP to bound bipartite quantum correlations, we have to regard Bob and Charlie as one party
that have the input set {00, 01, 10, 11} and the output set {00, 01, 10, 11}. Because Alice has two measurement
choices that each yields one out of two outcomes, there are 2× 2 = 4 projection operators on Alice’s side. Bob and
Charlie have four measurement choices that each yields one out of four outcomes, so there are 4× 4 = 16 projection
operators on Bob and Charlie’s side. We put these 20 operators in a set S = {S1, . . . , S20}. Then a 20×20 matrix Γ
is associated to the set S through Γij = Tr(S
†
i Sjρ). We fix the state ρ and Bob and Charlie’s measurements and fill
in the matrix Γ with determined values Tr(S†i Sjρ) with Si, Sj belonging to Bob and Charlie’s side. We also impose
the constraints that probabilities are nonnegative and sum to 1, as well as the no-signalling condition. Finally we
maximize Alice’s average payoff subject to Γ ≥ 0. The resulted upper bound is approximately 1.138. So we can
infer that Alice cannot obtain a higher average payoff by unilateral deviation. In the same way we can check that
neither Bob nor Charlie can obtain a higher average payoff by unilateral deviation. So the quantum fair strategies
constitute an equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
Games have been widely used to explain quantum mechanics and demonstrate the advantage of quantum mechan-
ics. Conflicting interest games are seldom studied in the context of quantum pseudo-telepathy games. Recently
some authors [13, 14] have given new examples of two-party conflicting interest games where quantum advice en-
hances social optimality. The present paper has given two new three-party conflicting interest games of this genre.
The first one is related to the original common interest GHZ game [5], while the second one is related to the
Svetlichny inequality [17]. The future work is to find more conflicting games where quantum mechanics offers an
advantage, for example when larger than 3-dimensional quantum systems are used or in a more than 3-party setting.
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